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Abstract
Theintroductionofcontractregimesfortheprovisionofbuss ervices,suchascompetitivetendering1andperformance-basedcontracts,isusuallypremisedonaprior
assumptionthatthesizeofthephysicalcontractareaisgivenandthatanypolicies
relatedtointeractionsbetweencontractareas,suchasintegra tedticketingand
fares,2areagreedto.Thisarticleexaminestheevolvingargumentsth atencouragea
reviewofcontractareasizesbeforerecontractingandthepositionssupportingthe
benefitsofservicequality-relatedissuessuchasanintegratedfarespolicy.Giventhat
agrowingnumberofanalysts(especiallyinEuropeandAustrali a)arepromotingthe
appealofincreasingphysicalcontractareasizetofacilitate, amongotherreasons,an
integratedfareregime,itistimelytoexploretheprosandco nsforsuchreformto
ensurethattheyarenotcounterproductivetothedesiredoutcomesofareform
process.Theargumentspresentedherecautionthesupportfortoosmallanumber
oflargecontractareasongroundsofinternalefficiencylosse sandlimitedgainsin
networkeconomies(butsupportamalgamatingverysmallcontractareas).Existing
15

JournalofPublicTransportation,Vol.6,No.3,2003

empiricalevidence,limitedasitis,tendstosupportcontract areas(anddepots)
currentlyservicedbyfleetsizesintherange30to100regard lessofurbandevelopmentprofile.Alternativewaysofdeliveringcross-regionalandbroad-basednetwork
benefitsareproposed.
Introduction
Reformofthebussectorinmanycountrieshasfocussedonalte rnativeservice
deliveryregimessuchascompetitivetendering3andperformance-basedquality
contracts(see,forexample,HensherandStanley[2003]andPre stonandvande
Velde[2002]fordetails).Twoissuesthatarisewhendetailingspecificreformstrategiesarethegeographicaldefinitionoftheservicearea(ore venwhetheritisa
single route as in London) and the flow-through implications of  service quality
initiativessuchasintegratedfares.4Thelatterrelatestotheabilityofapassengerto
travelbetweenpublictransportmodesandoperatorsonasingle fareaswellas
potentiallyofferingtimesavings.5)
Indevelopinganimplementationplanforperformance-basedcont racts(suchas
theonedevelopedbyHensherandHoughton[2003]),anumberof commentators have raised the question of how many contracts should best  be provided
within a particular geographical setting. Should we take the ex isting contracts
(and areas) or rationalize the contracts to a smaller number? A rguments proposedforfewercontractareasaremainlyrelatedtoadministra tivecoherenceand
passenger benefits from network integration. A concern with few er contracts
(dependingonthemeaningoffewer)isthepotentiallossof internalefficiency
andthehighriskofmonopolypowerand/ormarketdominance,wi thresultant
pressuresongovernmenttoincreasesubsidiesbeyondwhatcurre ntlyexistand/
orareinanysenseoptimal.
Thisarticleexaminestheargumentsforandagainstarangeof reforminitiatives
associatedwiththedeterminationofthegeographicalsizeofc ontractareas,as
wellasrevenueallocationandpatronagebenefitissueslinked tointegratedfares
associated with cross-contract service delivery. Although the article focuses on
Australia(Sydneyinparticular),andtoalesserextentEurope ,toillustratesomeof
theevidence,theargumentspresentedareofrelevanceuniversa llyandareespeciallyusefulfortheUnitedStates,whichappearstolagbehin dthereformprogramsofEuropeandAustralia.6
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Contract Area Size and Number
Theproblemisthatindividualfirmsinthetransportationindu striesprovideserviceonlyoverlimitedportionsofanetwork, but
[some]customersdemandsextendovertheentirenetwork.The
necessityofprovidingthrough servicefromanyorigintoany
destinationrequirescooperationamongfirmswhoarealsoexpectedtocompeteinthenewenvironmentofregulatoryreform.
Theseindustrieshavebeenregulatedinthepastpreciselytodeal
withtheinterconnectandcompetitiveaccessissues.Butthe[competitionpolicy]lawsgenerallypresumethatfirmsshouldcompete
[inapotentialifnoactualsense],notcooperate.(Tye1987:xviii)
Istheresuchathingasanoptimalcontractareasizeinageo graphicalsense?7What
criteriamightoneapplytodecideonthis?Presumablytheansw errelatestodemand-sideconsiderations,suchasnetworkconnectivityimpacts (economiesof
scopethroughnetworks,integratedfares,etc.),andthesupply-side,intermsof
costandservicedeliveryefficiencies.Itisnotdissimilarto theargumentsonthe
optimalnumberoffirmsinanindustry.8
Therearetwoissues(atleast)toaddress:(1)whatlikelycha ngesinnetworkservice
delivery are desired and can be achieved by amalgamating contra ct areas that
cannotbeachievedbyalternativestrategies,suchasestablish ingnetworkalliances
(evenincentive-basedones9)withintheexistingcontractarearegime;and(2)will
suchamalgamationslosetheinternal(toanoperator)efficienc iesthatcurrently
existandwhichpromotesufficientobservationsforbenchmarkin gperformance?
Howmanycontractareasareappropriate?PrestonandvandeVelde(2002)commentthattheU-shapedsubsidyprofiledetectedovertimeincompetitivetendering is, in part, due to the winners curse10 but more importantly in the current
context,inpart,duetoexcessiveconcentrationorcollusion. Theuppingofprices
inrebidsisbecomingcommon(asobservedinEuropeinparticul ar)asthenumberofbiddersdrops(asaresultoffeweroperatorsinthemar ket).Contractarea
sizeisafeatureoftheliteratureonspatialmonopolywheree achcontractareamay
beinthehandsofafewoperatorswhoareabletocolludeacti vitiesacrosscontract
areasundertheircontrol.Byamalgamatingcontractareasthis istantamountto
thesameimplicationsforefficiency(albeitlegally)ascollusion.
Thetrade-offsbetweennetwork/demandeconomiesandinternalef ficiencywill
dependonanumberofstructuralandhistoricallycontingentch aracteristicsin17
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cluding such different aspects as urban development and operato r culture
(Carlquist2002).ThiswascertainlytrueintheSydneycontext intheearly1990s
whentheNSW1990PassengerTransportActwasintroduced.Itdefinedasuiteof
78 contract areas based primarily on incumbency (tantamount to grandfather
rights).Sincethenthenumberofoperatorshasbeenreduced,w hilethecontract
areashaveremainedintact.Newglobaloperatorshavemovedin toSydney(e.g.,
NationalExpressfromtheUnitedKingdom,ConnexandTransdevfromFrance)
lookingforopportunitiestoexpandintheAustralianmarket.W heregeographicallyadjacentoperatorshavebeenwillingtosell,inpartdue topressurestosell
fromthelargeglobaloperators,butalsobecauseofthepercei veduncertaintyof
the new reform agenda (under discussion in 2003 but without a d irection to
date),thereisevidenceoflargerserviceareasunderoneoper ator(strictlythesame
contract areas as before but now bringing a capability of cross -contract operations).
TheStateTransitAuthorityofNewSouthWales(STA),thegovernment-owned
operator,isthelargestoperatorwith26contractsandrunsthepublicbusnetworkwhichcoversalmosthalfofSydney(1.61.8millionpopula tion,nearly800
squarekilometres,and1,750busesoperatingoutof11depots) centeredonthe
SydneyCBD(SeeFigure1).Ithasmanyadjacentcontractareas sothatitsservices
arenotdeliveredonacontractareabasisperse,operatingas oneverylargeprovider.TheSTAhasdesignedaroutenetworkofservicesthattakespassengersto
keycentersacrossaregion,notjustwithinthecontractarea. Thisnetworkeconomy
isachieved,however,atarelativelyhighinternalinefficienc ycostof$4.86perbus
kilometer11(incontrasttothebestpracticecostof$2.60/buskilometerf orprivate
operatorswhocurrentlyhave53contractsamong30operators). Theimportant
questionhereinistheextenttowhichthecross-contractarea serviceprovision
hascontributedtothesehigherunitcostsorwhetheritisthe productofgovernmentownershipandspecificrestrictionsofservicedelivery.Partcanbeattributed
toexternalitiessuchastrafficcongestion.BasedontheSTAsoperationsoutsideof
theSydneyMetropolitanArea(inNewcastle,aregionalCenter1 20kmsfromSydney
withapopulationofabout500,000),wecouldreducethe$4.86 to$3.54(Daniels
2002). However internal inefficiency must account for much of t he remaining
incrementabove$2.60.
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Figure 1. The Sydney Metropolitan Area and the STA Contract Area
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The literature on industrial organization from which ideas cent ral to tendering
evolvedsuchasprincipal-agentrelationships,transactionscos ts,andeconomies
ofscaleandscope,putsforwardcompellingargumentsthatmany ofthegainsin
service delivery to the market can be effected through preserva tion of smaller
effectivemanagementunitsworkingwithinarangeofalliances tructures,where
eachallianceisestablishedtobestaccommodatetheinterests ofthemarket(i.e.,
customers)andtheinterestsofthesupplyingstakeholders(see HayandVickers
[1987] and Williamson [1987]). To assume that one large organization with a
singlelargecontractarea(orevenafewunderanoligopoly)isthebestwayforwardinservicingthemarketisquestionable.Itassumesthatt hetransactionscosts
betweenoperatorsandcustomersareexcessiveandthetransacti onscostswithin
anorganizationarenonexistentorminimal12. Indeed the literature on the economictheoryofregulation(orcapturetheory)describeshowregulatoryagencies may end up more or less in the pocket of those whom they p urport to
regulate.Theresponseinsomeindustrieshasbeenthedismantl ingofsuchregulatory frameworks through economic deregulation (e.g., airlines , telecommunications),withareplacedregulatoryregimefocusedonmonitori ng.
Thereisananalogousliteraturearguingforlocalspecializati onandalliancesinsteadoftheformationoflarge,single-entitybusinesses.Inde ed,itdoesnottake
longbeforeweseemanyoftheverylargeentitiesessentially operatingasasetof
separate entities with occasional cross-subsidy to facilitate short-run (at least)
viabilityacrosstheentiresetoforganizationsundertheone control.Thisbreeds
inefficiency(likegovernmentsbailingouttheirownpublicmon opolies)andupward pressures on subsidy support from government. As Preston a nd van de
Velde (2002) state  governments caving in to operators suffering from the
winners curse or generally finding life tough was a real threat to competitive
tenderinginsomecountriesandsituations.
Fundamentally, the reduction in the number of contract areas runs the risk of
furtherpromotingdominanceandafurthermoveawayfromtheid ealsofcompetitionpolicy.13Itisadangerousmoveifiterodesthecompetitivebaseofthebus
marketinthesensethatitreducestheabilitytopromoteand maintainaprocess
ofeffectiveorpotentialcompetitionsoastoachieveamoree fficientallocationof
resources.14Inlargemeasure,wehavetoputtothetestthecasethatsuc hamalgamations deliver additional benefits that more than outweigh t he additional
costs.
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Howeveralliancesdonotjusthappen.Themarketmaywellsend signalstoencouragesuchalliancesbutthereisnoguaranteethatthesigna lswillberegistered
andactedupon.Toensuremarketsignalactivation,appropriateinformationand
incentives needtobeputinplace.Government,through itsregulatoryagency,
canmakeamajorcontributiontothisprocess.Inthepresenceofimperfectinformation,signalingandincentivesystemsareatthecenterstage.Todateinmost
internationalsettingswhereregulatoryreformisactive,thereislittleevidenceof
alliances (although see Norway in the next paragraph), which is  disappointing,
butthismaywellbeexplainedbythestrategicintentofthen ew(global)players
andthelackofincentivesinthepast.Theevolutionofallian ceswillrequiremuch
moreincentive-driveninitiativesbytheregulatorespeciallyw herethereisalossof
internal efficiency due to the scale of operations. There is no  denying that this
happens, but what is important is the size of an operator beyon d which such
internal efficiencies come into play. In Sydney, for example, where most recent
purchasesinvolveoperatorscontrollingmorethan100buses,th eseareworrying
signals(seeevidencebelow).
There is an interesting history of cooperation and merger in Be rgen, Norway
(Carlquist2002).Althoughamergerattemptbetweenthetwomaj oroperators
failedintheearly1990s,itledtosubstantialrouteandfare cooperation.In1998a
new merger attempt succeeded. Furthermore, all bus companies in  the region
alreadycooperatedinanallianceregardingelectronicticketin gfarecoordination
andpurchasing.Itwas,therefore,easyfortheregionalpublic transportauthority
toimposearequirementforintegratedfaresintheperformance contract,initiatedin2000.Theoperatorswereobligedtohaveacommonticke tingsystemand
fare tariff, but there is no limit to the upper fare level. The re is no evidence to
support(orfalsify)theexistenceofnewpatronageattractionorincreasedbenefits
toexistingpassengers,althoughCarlquist(2002)suggeststhat thelatterismore
likelythantheformer.Ineithercase,itwouldbedifficulttohypothesisethata
successfulintegrationwasduetoregulatoryintervention,asasuccessfulalliance
betweentheoperatorsalreadyexisted.
Whether by amalgamation of ownership or alliance formation, the se are both
mergerphenomenon.Forexample,combiningthreecontractareas intoonearea
isa(horizontal)mergerandshouldbeassessedalongthesame linesasthemerger
oftwoorganizations.Ifthereareeconomiesofscale(forthe exactsameservice
type),thenthereareefficiencygains.Therealizationofthesegains,however,could
beoffsetbywelfarelossesduetoreducedcompetition,beita ctualoryardstick,in
21
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the case of either competitive tendering or performance-based c ontracts (the
latterduringthecontractperiodincompetingforincentivepa yments,theformer
atthetimeofbidding).DeBorgerandKerstens(2000)reviewth eevidenceand
conclude overall that there are no economies of scale but mild economies of
scope associated with demand complementarities where the eviden ce suggests
spatialdemandexistsbeyondcontract/operatorareas.Thelatte risanempirical
issue.ItisinvestigatedbelowforSydneywherethereisverylittleintercontractarea
use of public transport but opportunities for cross-regional se rvices capable of
beingdeliveredefficientlybyasingleoperator.Indeed,asorganizationsincreasein
size,theylosetherelativeprecisionrequiredtoestablishth evalueofspecificactivities;incontrast,throughalliancesthereismuchmoreprecisionandtransparency.
AsynthesisofsomekeythemesisgiveninTable1.

Table 1. Synthesis of Key Issues in Determining
Optimal Size Operator/Contract Area
Theme

Comments



Asitincreases,thereisoperationaldependencyonavailabilityoffixedfacilities(centraldepot,localterminal



Veryhighfixedcostsofdepotswhichrequiresharingofthese
costs

Densityofroutenetwork
andnetworkeconomies

)



Presenceofsuchhighcostsinvolvesatradebetweensharing
costsovermanymoreactivities/services,risksofdiseconomies
ofscaleandeliminationofpotentialcompetition(eitherleadingtoentryunderderegulationorcompetitivetenderingor
competitionforincentivepaymentsunderPBC)

RouteStructure



Thebalancebetweendegreesofhubbingrangingfromhubdominatedtomoreuniformdistributioninurbanareamoves
tolatterasacontinuousspatialdiffusionofurbanactivities
takesplace

Demandcomplements



Attributes of individual services as demand complements
meansthatachangeinfrequency(say)ofoneserviceaffects
thedemandforanother

Internalefficiency



Delivering services under benchmarked best practice in respectofcostefficiency,costeffectiveness,andserviceeffectiveness
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The Theoretical Argument

Therelevantliteratureontheoptimumnumberoffirmsinamar ketfocuseson
thecostandperformancestructureofeachfirmbothinrespect ofthesupplyof
servicesandthewelfarebenefitstopassengersofaspecifics upplyregime.Evidence
ofscaleandscope(especiallynetworkeconomies)isanimporta ntbasisforcommentingontheappropriatenumberofoperators(andhencecontr acts).
Transactioncosteconomics(TCE)providesanappealingframeworkwithinwhich
todeveloptheargumentsfortherolesofthemarketandgovernance.Atransactionoccurswhenonestageofactivityfinishesandanotherbeg ins.Withawellworkinginterfacethesetransfersoccursmoothly.Establishingasmoothtransfer
iswhatnetworkeconomies(includingintegratedfares)areallabout.Theirachievement is possible through a number of strategies such as allianc e contracts and
merger(seetheBergenexperiencecitedabove).TCEsupplantstheusualpreoccupationwithtechnologyanddistributioncosts,withanexaminat ionofthecomparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task compl etion under
alternativegovernancestructures.Itisasmuchabouttransact ionswithinasingle
entity(e.g.,onebusoperator,aregulator)asitisbetweenentities.Itpaysspecial
attentiontoinformationsignalingandprocessing(anditsasym metrythroughoutthesystem),boundedrationality(i.e.,theabilitytoproc essalimitedamount
ofinformation),hazard,opportunism,andassetspecificity.
Transactioncosteconomicsmaintainsthatitisimpossibletoconcentrateallofthe
relevantbargainingactionattheexantecontractingstage(wh ichiswhatcompetitivetenderingessentiallydoes).Instead,bargainingispe rvasiveinwhichcase
theinstitutionsofprivateorderingandthestudyofcontracti nginitsentiretytake
oncriticaleconomicsignificance.Performance-basedcontracts (PBCs)alignwith
thisview(seeHensherandStanley2003)sincethemarketopera tesactivelythroughout the contract period (under signals delivered through incent ive payments).
Thebehavioralattributesofhumanagents,wherebyconditionso fboundedrationalityandopportunismarejoined,andthecomplexattribute softransaction
withspecialreferencetotheconditionofassetspecificity,areresponsibleforthis
condition(Williamson1987:178).Alignmentofincentivesisce ntraltoefficient
contracts and property rights. The latter emphasises that owner ship matters,
withrightsofownershipofanassetdefinedastherightstou setheasset,theright
toappropriatereturnsfromtheasset,andtherighttochange theformand/or
substanceofanasset.
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Transactioncosteconomicsacknowledgesmeritinbothmonopolyandefficient
risk-bearingapproachestocontract.Itinsists,however,thatefficiencypurposes
are sometimes served by restraints on trade. (Williamson 1987:1 88). This statementbyapioneeroftransactionaleconomics,X-efficiency,andcontractingtheory,
iscrucialtothediscussionbecauseitputsforththeargument thatexaminationof
the underlying attributes of transactions discloses that restra ints on trade can
helptosafeguardtheintegrityoftransactionswhenfirm-speci ficinvestmentsare
athazard.
Evidence on Cost Savings from Scale of Operations

Oneusefulanalysistoestablishthepotentialgainsforlarger operations(which
alsomeanslargercontractareasandhencelessoperators)ist olookattheevidenceonperformanceoutcomeswhentenderingfordifferentsize bids.Acaveat:
Thegreatmajorityoftheempiricalevidencefocusesonoperati onalcostsavings
andlittleaboutthetruecostsofconductingtenderingandmon itoringetc.The
competitivetenderingofalargepublicsectorproviderdeliversanimmediatecost
savingbutitisaonce-onlygain.15Thisgainisgreaterwhenthepretenderedunitis
large(asinmostgovernment-ownedbusoperations,suchasoccu rredinLondon
inthe1980sand1990s)anditisbeingtenderedoutasaseto fsmallercontracts.
Subsequentretenderingofthesmallercontracts,however,leads toverylittlecost
savings if any. Indeed, the often-quoted cost savings up to 20 percent (net of
administrativecostsoftendering)donotshedlightonthecru cialquestionasto
whatproportionofthesesavingscanbeattributedtocompetiti vetenderingper
se.16Theswitchtoasmalleroperatorwithlowerfixedcostsandov erheadsinitself,
couldachievethesesavingsregardlessofthemechanismusedto selecttheoperator.
Themainmessageisthatsavingsincreaseassystemsizeincrea ses,whichimplies
that if we move to larger contracts by operator merger (or buyo uts by large
players),wecanexpectincreasesinthecostsofdoingbusines s.Whilethismight
notbedisputed,therebuttalislikelytocomeintermsofnet workeconomieson
thedemandside.Thisiswherewedrawontransactioncostecon omicstoassist,
sinceeveninthepresenceofeconomiesofnetworkintegrityth erearealternative
waysofdeliveringoptimalnetworkperformancewithoutcreating asmallnumberoflargeandrelativelyinefficientcontractareas.
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Summary of the Main Argument

Indeterminingtheappropriatesizeofcontractareas,itisim portanttorecognize
bothinternalefficiencyandexternalbenefitarguments.Intern alefficiencyargumentsrecognizetheimportanceoftheperformanceoftheservicedeliveryentity
regardlessofwhethertheobjectiveiscommercialorsocialobligation.Efficiency
encompassescostefficiency,costeffectiveness,andserviceeffectiveness.External
benefitsfocusprimarilyonaccessibilityand,inparticular,theintegrityofthenetworkandassociatednetworkeconomies.
Inconsideringtheappropriatesizeoftheservicedeliveryuni t(SDU),thecostsof
transactionareveryimportant.Thesecostsarenotlimitedto theinterfirmenvironment (which would include integrated fares and servicing of an interconnectednetwork)butincludethecostsoutlaidwithinafirm.An issueofrelevance
in achieving the efficiency and network benefits is the reveali ng of information
throughappropriatesignals(eitherfromthemarketorbyther egulator)toensurethatthebestinformationisactedupontodeliverservice stothemarketat
costefficientandeffectivelevelsthat,withinasubsidy-depe ndentenvironment,
delivers best value for money (in an efficiency and equity sens e) for the scarce
subsidy dollar.
Looking at the internal efficiency of an SDU, the evidence from the published
literaturesupportstheviewthattherearenoscaleeconomies (over100buses)17
but mild network economies.18 The latter translates in particular into an argument for having fewer (or even one) SDU operating a network-bas ed crossregional service, since the argued benefits to passengers are g reater than if the
cross-regional services were provided by more than one operator. The assumptionimplicitinthisevidenceisthatpassengerswouldhaveto transferbetween
modes(orbusoperators)tocompletetheirjourney.Thesenetwo rkeconomies
arerelativelyweakwherecross-regionalservicesareshownto bedeliverableby
smaller operators who move through other contract areas or wher e, through
contractareaalliancesforspecificroutes,theycanpickupa nddropoffpassengers
anywherealongtheroute.
AgoodexampleinSydneyoftheformeristheprivateoperator,ForestCoaches,
who has a service from St. Ives/Chatswood (20 kms north of the city in a very
wealthyarea)tothecity;agoodexampleofthelatteristhe 35kmorbitalservice
about5kmsoutfromtheCBDinPerth(WesternAustralia)operatedthroughan
allianceofthreeoperators.Thislastexampleisequivalentto whatAdelaide(South
25
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Australia) would refer to as a route-specific contract across contract areas (see
Appendix2).Creatingamonopolysuppliertodeliverthemildn etworkeconomiesisfalseeconomysinceitwillalmostdefinitelyleadtom ajorlossesininternal
efficiency.Rather,giventheevidencefromtheTransportDataCentre(TDC)ofthe
NSW government that the majority of travel in Sydney occurs loc ally19 (mainly
withinonecontractareabutalsobetweentwoadjacentcontractareas),typically
over80percentofalltrips(oftenwithinasinglecontractar eausingabusservice
locallyortoaccessarailinterchange),theriskofdeliverin ghighlyexpensivelocal
servicestothemajorityofusersjusttosatisfyaclaimonne tworkeconomiesfora
smallamountofpatronageservicedeliveryispooreconomics.I ndeed,encouraging longer trips by any form of transport seems inconsistent wi th a desire to
curtailtravelandpromotemorelocalactivity.
Animportantmessagefromtheinstitutionaleconomicsliteratureisthatweshould
focusonefficiencyandnotmarketpower(theconcernwithredu cingthenumberofcontractareas);andweshouldnotaggregateoperatorso rcontractareas
justtogainnetworkbenefitsinsituationswheremostofthese benefitsarewithin
anexistingcontractareainthemain.Throughrecognitionofm arketopportunities (using appropriate signalling methods to reveal and share information and
hencereduceinformationasymmetry)createdbypartnershipsbet weenalloperatorsandgovernment(viatheregulator),andtheformationofo peratoralliances
toservespecialisedcross-regionalmarketniches,themajortr ansactioncosts(e.g.,
information asymmetry) appear to be more than offset by the hug e gains in
internalefficiencyassociatedwithoperatorswithcontractsinthe30to100fleetsizerange.Importantly,anindividualoperatormayhavemorethanonecontract
(asmanydo),buttherearesensibleargumentstosupportthem aintenanceof
eachcontractasaseparatebusinesscenter.Largeoperations,suchasmanyAsianbasedbusbusinesses(e.g.,inHongKong),mightbenefitbyreviewingtheirstructuresandmayreducethegrowinglevelsofsubsidysupportthat ,inpart,funds
inefficiencies.

Integrated Fares: Regulatory Control and/or Genuine Benefit
to Passengers?
Dopeopleneedtousemorethanonemodeofpublictransport/
operatortousepublictransportasanalternativetothecar?Maybe
thetransfersassociatedwithmulti-modalmovementareamajor
barrierregardlessofwhatfarearrangementsareinplace?
26
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Integratedfaresareseenasawayofattractingmorepublictr ansportpatronage
becausetheyenableonetopurchaseamultimodaland/ormultiop eratorticketat
one point in time from one source. Although there is initial ap peal in this fare
strategy,thejustificationmustbebasedonanagreedsetofobjectives.Themost
importantmustbeabenefittopassengers(andassociatedflow- throughtooperatorsandthecommunityatlarge).Itisassumedthatoneof thereasonswhy
publictransportisnotusedasmuchasitmightisthepoorin tegrationofservices
across the network. One feature of poor integration is the need  to purchase a
separateticketfromeachoperator,whichisassumedtobemoreexpensivethan
thepurchaseofasinglemultimodal/operatorfarebecauseofth efixed-costcomponent in each ticket. The presumption is that there would be a  single-fixed
componentinanintegratedfare(althoughthisneedstobedemo nstrated).
Overriding the actual fare level is the issue of network integr ity and what this
actuallymeansforpassengergrowthandbenefit.Whatistheev idencethatpassengersactuallywanttotravelbyanumberofpublictransport modesacrossa
networkifthemodeswerebetterintegrated?Whatistheeviden cethatintegrated
faresisthesolution(orevenasignificantcontributor)?Thecounterfactualswould

havetoshowthatimprovedintegration,onwhatevercriteriaareadopted,would
indeedshowmovementsbetweenmodesandoperatorsthatarecurrentlynotable
tobeundertaken.Theopportunityforsuchtraveldoesexistinmostcities(at least

tosomeextent)intermsofservicesavailable,butisitwhat peoplewant?Sucha
systemleadstotransfersandwithgreaterdominanceofafewo peratorsthereisa
realriskonhubbingwherebytransfersbecomeanegativefeatur e.Theevidencein
Appendix 1 from around the world initially looks compelling, bu t it must be
interpreted very carefully. What exactly are we seeingsome sort of discount
disguised through integrated fares and/or genuine contributions  to improving
mobilityacrossthenetwork?
Toillustratethismatter,Table2showstheyear2000evidenceonpublictransport
useinSydneyinvolvingmorethanonepublicmode.Theuseofm ultiplepublic
modesin2000is17.4percent.Thistabledistinguishesthenum beroftimesina
tripthataspecificmodeisused.Ofparticularinterestisth euseofmorethanone
bus for a one-way trip. Out of a total of 1.29 million daily pa ssenger trips that
involve at least one public mode in a trip chain, 2.861 percent  of all trips (i.e.,
36,982 trips) involve two or more buses. It might be argued tha t switching between buses highlights a downside of services that is better de livered through
single-vehiclecross-regionalservices.Thegreateramountoft hemultiple-bustrips
27
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are on government buses (31,508 or 85.2%) operating close to th e CBD, which
maysaysomethingpositiveabouttheabilitytotravelbeyondc ontractareasby
busalthoughitsayssomethingnegativeinrespectoftherequi rementtohaveto
transfer.20

Table 2. Average Day Linked Trips Involving at Least
One Public Transport Mode, HTS2000
PublicBus
Ferry

PrivateBus

Train

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

0

0

3

0

0

4

0

1

0

0

1

2

3

4

Total

338,364

28,065

1,396

346

368,171

446,502

72,852

3,229

34,132

2,868

197

235

2,739

571

522,583

214

37,432
3,524

428

428

267,790

2,372

270,162

0

1

1

45,883

2,605

48,488

0

1

2

1,926

365

2,291

0

2

0

6,688

0

2

1

2,471

0

3

0

1,397

6,688
132

2,603

1,397

1

0

0

15,281

5,166

1

0

1

2,574

1,044

1

0

2

1,252

1

1

0

634

1

1

1

375

2

0

0

1,055

1,070

21,517
3,618
1,252

234

868
375

159

1,214

Note:Dataincludestripsthatmayhaveusedother(non-T)modes.Theothermodesareignored;
thereforeonepublicbusmaymeanonepublicbusonlyoronepublicbuspluscar.
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Interconnectivity involving more than one bus operator in Sydne y is negligible
(evenifonearguesthisisduetorelativelypoorexistingint erconnectivity)andis
unlikelytobeofconcerntomostofthetravelingpopulation. Whileitmightbe
arguedthatthenatureoftheexistingnetworkofservicesdeni esthisopportunity
(andcertainlythecounterfactualsarenotavailable),ifsuch networkconnectivity
weretobeprovidedandwouldincreasepatronage,theissueof relevancehereis
whethercross-regionalandlong-haulmetropolitanservicescan beachievedunderexistingareacontractsbyappropriateallianceswhichpreservetheefficiencies
ofeachoperator(includingtransactioncostadvantages).
Therecentgrowthincross-regionalservicesinSydneybypriva teoperatorswithouttransfersdemonstratesoneusefulcounter-factualinwhichapassengercan
travel on a single-mode/single-operator service without transfe rs over long distanceswithintheSydneyMetropolitanarea(to/fromtheCBDwhi chisnotowned
byasinglecontractandanopen-accessservicezone).ExamplesincludetheWestbus
M2andHillsservices(inthenorthwest),HarrisParkCitybus( fromParramattain
thewest),andForestCoachesSt.Ives/Chatswood-Cityservice( inthenorth),allof
which serve the outer suburbs and deliver passengers into the C BD (see Figure
1).21SimilarexamplesexistfortheSTAexceptthatmanyoftheSTAservicesare
acrosscontractareasbelongingtotheSTAenablingpickupanddropoffacross
the contract areas (although one might argue that strictly this  is violating the
termsofacontract).Theneedforintegratedfaresintheseex amples(wherepublic
transport is showing evidence of serious competition with the c ar) is not relevant.22
Integratedfaresareaformofregulatoryinterventionifimpos edonalloperators
fromabovesinceallmustconformtothegrandplan.AsHibbs( 2000)hasindicated,constructsofintegration(ofwhichintegratedfaresare anexample)leadto
aweakeningofbotheffectivenessandefficiency.Itdeniesindividualoperatorsor
groupsofoperatorsthefullabilitytoberesponsivetomarket opportunitiesin
ways that are consistent with delivering the appropriate servic es to customers.
Again,Hibbsandothersarguethatotherthantheregardforsa fetyandissuesof
scale and power, public passenger transport is a market-based, customer-driver
activity and especially with regard to its relationship with the private car, from
wheremostofitscompetitioncomes.Integratedfaresdictated acrosstheboard
maywellbeinequitableaswellasaninefficientwayofsecuri ngoptimumsocial
benefit.23 Market-based fares policies designed to benefit users are need ed, and
thebesttestofthisisthelevelsofpatronageresultingfromthepolicy.Ifaspecific
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arrangementoralliancebetweenoperatorsinaparticularpubli ctransportchain
seesmeritinintegratedfares,thenthisshouldbesupported, butnotasacarte
blanche,no-choicepolicy.Theone-size-fits-allphilosophyisverydangerousand
counterproductive.
What Is the Broader Evidence on Patronage Benefits?

Thematterofintegratedfaresandimpactsonpatronageisnotwellstudied.There
arevirtuallynopublishedpapersonthetopicthatmaketheli nkclearandunambiguous.Thatis,unlessonecanseparateoutalltheothercha ngesthatarehappeningatthesametime(e.g.,farediscounting),24itisnotpossibletomakeany
sensible statements on the specific contribution of integrated/ intermodal/
interoperator fares.
Inreviewingtheliteraturewehavefoundanumberofcomments thatstatethat
intermodal fares are often inappropriate where one has mainly m ode-specific
travel.Thatis,mostcircumstanceswherethetopicismentioned,talkaboutlimitedmodalswitching(i.e.,railtobus)andfocusonsingle-mo dediscountedfares
andotherdeals(includingthegrowinginterestinmultipurpose faremediathat
enableonetouseasmartcardonbuses,shopping,cinemas).The examplesnever
refertosmartcardsfortravelingonbusesandtrains,whichis interestingbyits
absence.
ThestudiesinAppendix1arebasedonaliteraturereviewbyB oozAllanHamilton
(BAH)in2002.Mostarequestionable.Forexample,oneoftheb etterstudiesby
London Transport (Fairhurst 1993) found that the introduction of Travelcards
boostedpassengermilesinthefirstyearby3.83percentisba sedonveryaggregatedtimeseriesdata.Wequestionwhatothercontrolvariableswereincluded.
ThepaperbyFooteandDarwin(2001)forChicagoconcludesthat a3.6percent
increaseinridershipoverayearwhenAFCwasintroducedisattributedtomany
factorsbutmostisattributedtofarepolicieswithinasingle mode(whichismore
reflectiveofwherethemarketis).Theoverallgrowthimpact( i.e.,newtrips)ofall
sources of fare changes is maximally 30 percent of 3.6 percent or 1.08 percent.
Clearlymuchlessthan10percentsuggestedbytheBAHreview.25
TheDutchrail-taxicombinationintroducedin2000isanothere xampleofintegration of two modes. One cannot infer anything about patronage  growth
because the new taxi services provided were rather different from those of the
ordinarytaxis.Thetrain-taxishavealowerqualityofservice .Withmorepassengers
per taxi, one may have to wait at the railway station. Another example is the
30

ContractAreasandServiceQualityIssues

introductionofthestandardizednationwidebus/tram/metrotick etintheNetherlandsinthe1970s,enablingpassengerstousethesameticke tirrespectiveofthe
modeorthecompanyprovidingtheservices.Nomonitoringwasu ndertakenon
theeffectsofitsintroductionatthattime.Suchchangestendnotonlytoencourageintegrationbutalsoproduceadifferentpricestructure.

Conclusions
Theargumentsandevidencepresentedinthisarticlesuggestth attheperceived
gainsfromthereductioninthenumberofcontractareasarelikelytobeillusory.
Ifthegainsinnetworkeconomiesarenotsufficientlylargeto outweighanylikely
lossofinternalefficiency,thereisacaseforamalgamatingcontractareastoensure
thatlocalservicesarenothamperedbycross-contractareacon straintsonservice
delivery.Giventhemajorfocusonlocalserviceprovision,opportunitiestodeliver
appropriatecross-regionalandcross-networkservicescanberevealedandpromotedbypartnershipsbetweenbusoperatorsandtheregulator.
Amechanismbywhichtheappropriatemarketsignalsarecapture dandmade
availabletoallrelevantparties(i.e.,thereleaseofinforma tion)isrequired.Integrated fares as one instrument to promote network public transp ort activity,
whilehavingsomemerit,areunlikelytobeamajorinfluenceo nthetake-uprate
ofcross-regionalnetworkservicessincetheyarebestsupplied asasinglemodal
service through an alliance or agreement for a single operator to deliver crosscontractroute-specificserviceswheretransfersareminimised ifnoteliminated.
Thenandonlythenmightwehaveachanceoftakingsometraffi cfromthecar
market.
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Appendix 1. Impact of Fares and Ticketing Integration
on Patronage International Case Studies
Source:BoozAllanHamiltonReview2002

London
As part of a number of initiatives to increase public transport  use, multimodal
Travelcardswereintroducedforbusandundergroundservicesduringearly1983.
RailwaslaterincludedintheschemewiththemergingofTravelcardandCapitalcard
during1989.Fairhurst(1993)soughttoseparatelyisolatepatr onageimpactsfrom
changesinfaresandfaresintegration.Thefirstyearimpactf romfaresintegration
was significant with passenger miles increasing around 18 perce nt on buses, 28
percentonundergroundservices,and24percentoverall.

Paris
Inmid1975,theOrangeCardwasintroducedintheParisregi on.Thecardisa
nontransferable,monthly(oryearly)seasonticketthatcanbe usedondifferent
transportmodesincludingbus,themetro,suburbantrain,andv ariousoperator
networks(i.e.,RER,SNCF,APTR).TheOrangeCardhashadasignificanteffecton
patronagealthoughtheimpactsonbusandmetroserviceshavebeendisproportionate.

NewYork
AmajorchangeinticketingoccurredinNewYorkduring1997withtheintroductionoftheMetroCard.Astoredvaluecard,theMetroCardcanbeusedonthe
busandthesubwayandisacceptedbyalloperators.TheMetroC ardhadasignificant effect on patronage, particularly buses. Between July 1996  and July 1997,
averageweekdaybusridershipincreased16.9percentandaverag eweekendbus
ridershipincreased20.2percent.Theeffectsonthesubwaywer elessmarked,with
weekdaysubwayridershipincreasingby2.6percent.Overallrid ershiplevelswere
attheirhighestsince1971(Walker1997).

Zurich
Priortotheintroductionofintegratedticketing,Zurichwasc haracterizedbyan
exceptionallyhighlevelofpublictransportuse.Scheduleswer ecoordinatedona
voluntarybasiswitheachoperatorhavingitsownfares.
After the formation of the Zurcher Verkenrsverbund (ZVV), a comprehensive
integratedfareandticketingsystemwasintroduced.Thisinvol vedthefullcoordi32
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nationofservicesandthedevelopmentofasinglefaresystembasedonzonalfares.
Thecombinationofthesetwofactorsincreasedoverallpatronag ebyanaverage
12 percent in the first twp years of operation, with significan t increases of 53
percentand30percentforfeederbusesandheavyrailrespecti vely(Laube1995).

Surrey
SurreyCountyCouncilhasmadesignificantinvestmentsinsever alpublictransportschemesincludingtheTravelwideticketinWoking.Usersurveyswereconductedtoevaluatetheperformanceofsuchschemes.Surveysrev ealedthatthe
Travelwide ticket had little effect on patronage in terms of take-up by existing
users(i.e.,lessthan2%ofbususershadusedtheTravelwideticket).TheTravelwide
tickethadlimitedsuccessingeneratingnewbusjourneys.Overall,thestudyconcludedthatthemultiplejourneyTravelwidetickethadanegligibleeffectonpatronage (unknown author).

LosAngeles
Interoperatortransfersaccountedforlessthan0.5percentoftotalregionalrides
priortothegrowthoffaresandserviceintegration.Asservic eandfaresintegration grew, the number of passengers making multioperator trips increased. By
1994thenumberofmultioperatortripshadincreased2percent (i.e.,11million
boardingsperyear)(CarterandPollen1994).

Chicago
AChicagostudyestimatedthatridershipwouldincreasebetween 2to5percent
as a result of the introduction of automated fare collection sy stems (Dinning
1996).

WestMidlands
Oneofthefirstmajorexamplesof integratedticketing in Britain wasthe West
MidlandsTravelcardschemeintroducedin1972.Asresultoftheschemeitwas
estimated that 7 percent more trips were being made by 1981 (Wh ite and
Brocklebank 1994).\

Singapore
During 1991 to 1992, the Farecard system in Singapore increas ed passenger
numbersby2.5percent.Giventheincreasesinfarelevels,thi soutcomewasnot
anticipated(BaggaleyandFongChoonKhin1994).
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Appendix 2. Contract Area Size: The Adelaide View
Source:TomWilson,PassengerTransportBoard,Adelaide
OurlimitedexperienceinAdelaidewasthatthereseemedtobelittleinterestfrom
tenderers in contracts with less than 30 buses (e.g., the Outer NE Transit Link
Contract for 25 buses). Of course, there are many arguments abo ut bus depot
size,butalargecontractcaneasilyhaveanumberofdepots.
Assomeonewholargelydesignedtheshape/size/boundariesofou rAdelaidecontracts,Iwouldsuggestthatthemostimportantissuesare:
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Closelyexaminingthestructureoftheexistingroutenetworkt oseehow
itfitstogether,andlocatethenaturalbreaksandboundaries



Examining geographic boundaries



Examining passenger travel patterns as well as having a knowled ge of
nonpublictransport(butpotential)travelpatterns



Asthemainall-daypublictransportpassengerflowsinAustral iansuburbs
areprimarilytotheCityandtomajorregional/districtcenters,thesecenters(andmajorinterchangepoints)shouldformthefocuspoint sofcontractareas.Theycaneitherbeinthecenterofthem,sothec ontractarea
surrounds and focuses on them, or on the boundaries of two or m ore
contract areas, so that each adjacent contract area can focus o n those
centers.Thetradeareasofthesecentersisanimportanteleme ntincontractareadesign



Allowingcross-boundaryservicestocontinue,andensuringthat newcross
boundaryservicescanbeimplementedbywritingtheirpossibili tyintothe
contracts. Cross boundary services should generally be allocate d to the
contractareawithinwhichmostoftheroutefalls



Alternatively,verylongcrossboundaryroutescouldbetreatedasseparate
routecontracts,providingasignificantnumberofbusesisi nvolved



Small route groups that do not comply with all of the above sho uld be
amalgamatedwiththelargerareacontractstoallowflexibilityinnetwork
planning.Theycouldberetainedifnecessarywheretheyserve anisolated
area(e.g.,asuburbanareaononeofSydneysmanypeninsulascouldhave
itsowncontractwithoutimpactingonflexibility)
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Endnotes
Readers unfamiliar with the details of competitive tendering wi ll find a useful
summaryinHensherandBrewer(2001:2734.)
1

Integratedfaresisnotthesameasintegratedticketing.The latterreferstothe
technologicalplatformwithinwhichoperatorsprovideelectronictickets.
2

SeeNote1.

3

SeeNote2.

4

Althoughnotthefocusofthisarticle,animportantissueist hemechanismfor
distributing the fare revenue to the transport suppliers, compl icated in some
jurisdictionsbytheabsenceofaflagfallcomponentofabu sfareforeachlegof
atrip(i.e.,afixedoverheadchargepertripregardlessofdi stancetraveled).
5

6

AustralasiaincludesAustraliaandNewZealand.

Animportantdistinctionismadebetweencontract/operatorare asthatarea
singlerouteincontrasttoageographicalarea.Thedistinctio nappearsprimarilya
matterofsharedresourcessuchasdepotsandcoordinatedtimet abling.Areview
oftheliteraturefailedtofindasinglepaperaddressingthis issue.
7

Althoughthefirmsizeliteratureincludesdirectcompetition betweenfirms,it
alsorecognisessituationsinwhichfirmsoperateasspatialmo nopoliesasisthe
situationwithbusoperatorswhodonotcompeteinthemarket( eventhough
theycompetewiththecar).

8

Thequestionnotaddressedintheliteratureonbusprovisioni stheextentto
whichinnovativeopportunitiesaregreaterunderregimeswhichlessenthepower
oftheregulatorindeliveryofservices.Itmaybethecaseth attheempiricalevidence,aslimitedasitis,ismisleadingbecauseofthefailur eofincentivestructures
todeliverthegainswhichareinherentinalessconstrainedmarket.Weneedto
understandthecircumstancesunderwhichincentivescanevolveandbeeffective.
Oneproblemwiththebusindustrymaybethatthelackofexper ienceinmanagingchangeand/orthereticenceinbeinginnovativegivenahis toryofsuppression
of innovation is hampering the speed of taking up opportunities  waiting for
action.Generationalinheritance,forexample,whichoftenlack sanunderstandingoftheneedtosustainwealthandsurvivalleadstoareductioninentrepreneurialactivityandhenceadeclineinanypotentialinnovation.
9

35

JournalofPublicTransportation,Vol.6,No.3,2003

The winners curse exists when the winning operator discovers after winning
thatithasoverpaidgiventherealvalueofthetender.

10

11

Allcostsarein$AUD,with$AUD1.0approximatelyequalto$U.S.0.59.

Theinternalefficiencyofanorganizationdependsonthedegre eofcompetition
itfacesinsofarascompetitionaffectsmanagerialincentives andopportunities.
Onewaythatcompetitionsharpensincentives,andhenceinternalefficiency,isby
permitting the relative performance of agents to be compared. B enchmarking
runstherealriskofbeinglostwithaveryfewoperators.
12

InOslothereiscurrentlydiscussionaboutthecontractsizef orthefuturebus
tenders.Theauthorityhasclearlystatedthatoperatorsshould begivenfinancial
incentives for passenger growth and service quality, and performance contract
principles should be applied. The problem here is that there ar e two principalagentrelationships.Firstly,therewillbeacontractbetweenthecityandthemunicipal company (Oslo Sporveier) that serves as the public tran sport executive
(PTE).Thiswillbeanetwork-widenetcontractthatwillnotb etendered.Previously,thisrelationwassubjecttoaperformance-basedsubsidy,butthishasbeen
discontinued.Secondly,therewillbetenderedsubcontractsforvariouspackages.
Thesearethecontractsforwhichperformance-basedprinciples willbeapplied.
(Bothnetandgrosscontractsarecurrentlyinusefortheseop erations,buttenderinghasnotyetcommenced.)Toensureasufficientnumberofcompetitors,it
isexpectedthatthePTEwillwanttorestrictthesizeofcontractareas.Inpractice
thiswillmeanthatthetenderpackageswillconsistofasmall numberofroutes.
TheOslonetworkiscomplexandroutescrisscrossalloverthecity.Consequently,
itmaybedifficulttoimplementnet-costcontracts,atleastwithoutasophisticatedrevenueallocationsystem.Thealternativeisagross-cos tsystemwithquality
incentives,butthatissomethingdifferentfromtheHordaland typemodel,which
requiresanet-costcontract.
13

Althoughnotspecificallyrelatedtonumberofoperators,thei ssueofwhoowns
whatisveryimportantindeterminingeconomicefficiencyinservicedelivery.Operatingfranchises,suchasthoseinAdelaidethatseparateinvestmentfromoperatingdecisions,areboundtoresultinresourcemisallocation,manifestedbyovercapitalization and the production of dispensable and underutili zed services
(Berechman 1993:294). Apart from the diverse goals of the owner  of the assets
(i.e.,publicsector)whopromotesocialwelfareoutcomesinco ntrasttothecommercialoutcomesoftheoperator,thegovernmentandoperatordisproportion14
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atelysharetheoverallrisksincethebulkoftheriskassocia tedwithcapitalinvestment(notablythefleet)isassumedbygovernment.Withtheris kofovercapitalizationgreaterthanundersingleownership(andasinglecomme rcialobjective),
thelossofeconomicefficiencyisveryreal,exacerbatedifth eoperatorengagesin
higherriskprojectsthanitwouldotherwisedosoifitcarrie dthefullrisk.Thisrisk
can, in part, be circumvented by monitoring but at a much highe r level that
wouldberequirediftheoperatorcarriedalltherisk.Itisd oubtfulthatthegovernment would be able to acquire all the necessary information on costs and
demandwithoutoutlayingalotofresources.Transactionscostsarelikelytoraise
questionsaboutthevalueofthisapproachtoservicedelivery.Underrisk-sharing
thenotionthatbiddersareexpectedtobeartheentireriskst emmingfrominvestmentandoperationaldecisions,withthefacevalueoftheirbi dsservingasasound
predictoroftheirexpectedperformance,evaporates.
Ifcostsofhavingaprivatefirmsupplytheservicescouldbe reducedbymeans
ofanegotiatedcontract,theconsiderablecostsoforganizing acompetitivebiddingwouldbeaverted.Indeed acompetitivetenderingschemem ightinsome
cases be inferior to methods of contract renewal or negotiation (Berechman,
1993, 29899)
15

 Within the Sydney metropolitan area, private bus operators are  some of the
mostcostefficientintheworld.Consequently,competitivetenderingisveryunlikelytodeliverfinancialbenefit.

16

Thereisacaseforeconomiesofscaleinmovingfromaverysm alloperationsuch
as1to4busesuptoabout30buses,butovertherange30to 100weseealmost
constant returns to scale with decreasing returns to scale over  100 buses
(Berechman1993andpersonalcommunication(July11,2002)withKjellJansson,
Sweden). Fleet size is an appropriate indicator of scale, being  highly correlated
withothercontenderssuchaspopulationpersquarekilometer( acorrelationof
0.886fortheSTAcontractareas).Otherindicatorssuchasarea(insqkms)hasa
simplecorrelationof0.80forSTAareas.

17

TheSydney2000Olympicsprovidedvaluableevidenceonthisma tter(Hensher
andBrewer2003).Thedepotsetuptocoordinatebusservicesa ccommodated
morethan1,000buses,substantiallylargerthanthelargestde potinSydneyunder
normalconditions(anSTAdepotwith250buses).Inhindsight,itwasconcluded
that major internal efficiencies could have been obtained by ha ving a series of
smallerdepotsupto150buses.
18
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19

Wewouldarguethatthisiscommoninmostlargemetropolitanareas.

20. ResearchbyAlsnihandHensher(2003)suggeststhatseniorsand theelderly
(i.e.,individualsover55yearsold)arelessinclinedtouse publictransportwhere
transfersarerequired.
Examplesofcross-regionalservicesinthetextareveryweakb ecausetheydonot
involvepickingupanddroppingoffinmorethanonecontracta rea.(TheCBDof
Sydneyisnotacontractarea.)Thisabilitydoesnotexistamo ngprivateoperators
inSydneybecauseoftheexistingcontractrequirements.Itis suggestedthatthe
governmentoperator(StateTransit)hastruecross-regionalservicessuchasRoute
400(BurwoodtoBondiJunction),Route370(CoogeetoLeichhard t),andRoute
L20(CitytoParramatta).Privateoperatorshavenottodatede velopedstrategic
alliancestopickupanddropoffinmorethanoneoperatorsarea,denyingthemselvesofalliancerevenue.

21

 Althoughtheautomated fare collection (AFC) system of theSTA shows that
one in five boardings is made by a Travelpass ticket of which 66 percent are a
train+bus+ferryticketand32percentareabus-ferryticket(w ithonly3%being
busonly),itisunclearastowhethertheticketpurchaseract uallyusesmorethan
onemodeorissimplytakingadvantageoftheattractivediscou ntsoffered.For
example,theaveragediscountonTravelpassesisbetween27and 36percent.

22

Theinequityislikelytoarisefromcross-subsidytotherelat ivelywealthiertravelerswhotendtoundertakethelongertrips.
23

The introduction of integrated fares is often in conjunction wi th other measures,suchasincreasedmarketingbudgetstopushthenewtick etingandpromoting bus travel, better information systems, increased bus fr equencies and
discountstofares.Increaseddiscountingwouldbeafeatureof manyintegrated
ticketingexercisesandwouldhaveanimpactonridership.
24

Onerefereesuggested,Theappendicesdefinitelydemonstratei ncreasedridershipincasesoffareintegration.Whilenotdenyingtheabsoluteevidence,thetext
arguesthatthecontributionoffareintegrationtothepatrona geincreasesisby
nomeansclearandthatotherfactorshaveplayedarole.Wesu pportamuchmore
carefullyconstructedempiricalstudytoestablishthewidersetofinfluenceson
patronageincreasesratherthancredititalltofaresintegrat ion.

25
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